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1 Introduction
The increasingly visible presence of religion, in developing countries es-
pecially, has aroused the interest of economists during the last decades.
What is generally overlooked, however, is the relationship between religion
and politics (Aldashev and Platteau, 2013; Iyer, 2016). In particular, the
possibility that the former is being instrumentalized by the latter has not
been studied so far. We address this issue in the specific context of au-
tocracy, a political regime commonly found in developing countries: the
autocrat seeks the cooperation of religious clerics with a view to increasing
the political stability of his regime.
Exploration of the methods and tactics used by autocrats to maintain
themselves in power typically comprise repression, co-option, and the pro-
duction of public goods. While many political economy models of autocracy
consider only two actors (the ruler and the opposition), a growing number
of researchers distinguish between elites and citizens as two potential op-
position actors. To remain in power, autocratic rulers need not only stem
the threat arising from the citizenry, which can spark popular revolutions,
but also the threat coming from the elites, who can stage military coups
or provide the moral and financial support for revolutionary movements
(see Bove, Platteau, and Sekeris, 2016 for a short survey of the literature).
Yet, empirical evidence shows that spontaneous revolutions often fail if
they are not actively or passively supported by key members of the ruling
elites. Since autocrats are generally overthrown by members of their inner
circle rather than as a result of popular uprisings, they typically try to
buy off the support of elites, be they defined broadly (North, Wallis, and
Weingast, 2009; Egorov and Sonin, 2011), or more narrowly as economic
or military elites (see Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2010 for the latter
and Montagnes and Wolton, 2016 for the former). Because the elites must
be compensated in exchange for their political support, they entail costs
for the autocrat, and it is not a priori clear that he should maintain a large
body of inner supporters. Therefore, a trade-off exists between co-option
and repression.
What has been ignored so far is the possibility that autocrats extend
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their co-option efforts to religious clerics. This is a serious gap to the
extent that, in societies where levels of literacy and education are low,
the prestige and influence of these clerics are generally important. If they
so wish, they may therefore become effective opponents to the regime,
able to articulate people’s grievances and to mobilize their energies for the
purpose of confronting iniquitous rulers. For this reason, the autocrats
have an incentive to enlist potential religious rebels in their support. The
question then arises as to whether and how the organizational mode of the
dominant religion prevailing in a country affects the autocrat’s ability to
contain the religious threat. In particular, there is a need to distinguish
between centralized and decentralized religions.
This paper proposes a setup that explicitly takes the organization of
religions into account. It complements an earlier contribution (Auriol and
Platteau, 2016) in two ways. On the theoretical plane, it is based on an
alternative model that allows us to derive new analytical results. In this
new model, the autocrat chooses not only the extent of reforms to imple-
ment but also the level of wealth appropriation for the benefit of himself
and his inner circle. Moreover, instead of a continuum of clerics, we as-
sume that two well-differentiated types exist: moderates and radicals. The
general idea is that clerics dislike political corruption as well as progres-
sive (institutional) reforms, especially those touching on educational and
judiciary matters. We define as moderate those clerics who are rather soft
on matters of principles and hence more easily amenable to compromises
with political power. They tend to adhere to the tenet that clerics should
accept the authority of strong political rulers on the grounds that preserva-
tion of order and stability is a paramount objective justifying concessions
to ideological purity (see Platteau, 2017, for an elaboration). They can
thus be considered as politically and spiritually accommodating. Radical
clerics, by contrast, are more inflexible when issues of religious ethics are
concerned and, hence, they are more expensive to buy off.
On the empirical plane, we offer new material that deals with recent
regime cases rather than with historical country examples. Because Islam is
dominant in many developing countries and because it combines organiza-
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tional decentralization and political autocracy in an unambiguous manner,
it provides us with a privileged illustration of autocratic co-option of clerics
in the absence of a hierarchical church structure in modern times.
Under a decentralized religion, the central question is how the autocrat
decides whether he will co-opt the whole set of clerics or only a fraction of
them, a decision that directly hinges on the amount of material privileges
granted. Since the autocrat simultaneously chooses the extent of progres-
sive reforms and the level of corruption, two decisions that will generate
more or less hostility from the clerics, an important result concerns the
relationship between these decision variables: are reforms and embezzle-
ment substitutes or complements? It turns out that under a very large set
of conditions they are complements. This result helps to explain why in
many contemporaneous autocratic countries ”modernization” is associated
with ”corruption”. This association was very clear during the Arab spring,
when revolt erupted against autocratic leaders such as Ben Ali and Bashar
al-Assad, who were simultaneously reformist and corrupt. Unfortunately,
the fight against corruption comes in many cases with the rejection of tech-
nical and institutional innovations, as popular grievances are channelled by
radical religious leaders.
Another question that the model can highlight is the effect of a paramet-
ric change in the clerics’ sensitivity to progressive reforms and corruption.
We show that this effect actually varies depending upon the exact form
of radicalization of the clerics. If the radicalization is uniform among the
clerics (for instance, because the gross disutility of the reforms increases),
or if there is a shift in the distribution of the clerics so that a larger fraction
of them is radical (i.e. the new distribution first-order stochastically dom-
inates the initial one), then the autocrat simultaneously decreases reforms
and reduces embezzlement in order to enhance stability in reaction to these
changes. By contrast, if the radical clerics become even more radical while
the rest of the distribution is unchanged, the autocrat might choose to
abandon the idea of enlisting them, as it becomes too expensive to do so.
If he foregoes their support, he can then push more reforms and increase
embezzlement. Instability increases as the price to pay for achieving higher
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rents.1
Next, the effects of a centralized religion, where the autocrat bargains
directly with the head of the church, is compared with the effects of a
decentralized religion when interacting with autocratic power. First, cen-
tralized religions tend to lead to more political stability than decentralized
ones. Second, under conditions of full co-option of the clerics, more pro-
gressive (secular) reforms and more corruption are chosen by the autocrat
when the religion is centralized. In other words, during periods of political
stability decentralized religions lead to more inertia, and less corruption,
than centralized ones. This result is upset if the autocrat in the decentral-
ized case decides to extract more rents by pushing more reforms at the cost
of antagonizing the radical clerics. Instability increases while reforms and
corruption can be higher than in the centralized case.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model
used to describe the game played between an autocrat and the religious
clerics. The cases of centralized and decentralized religions are explored in
successive subsections, and the main results are summarized in the form of
five propositions: the first three belong to the decentralized case, the fourth
to the centralized case, and the last is the outcome of our comparative
exercise. In Section 3, we discuss empirical material with the purpose of
illustrating the main messages of the theory. We limit our attention to
autocratic Muslim countries, that is, to the case of a decentralized religion.
Emphasis is put on the contrast between rulers who succeeded in stabilising
their autocratic regime through co-option of most clerics and those who
accepted a measure of political instability by buying the allegiance of only
moderate clerics. Section 4 concludes the paper and shows how the division
of the clerical body into supporters of the regime and dissidents, when it
occurs, has led to an obscurantist deadlock that plagues a large part of the
Muslim world.
1These results are new compared to Auriol and Platteau (2016), which focuses on
reforms only, and studies only one form of radicalization (i.e., an uniform increase of the
disutility of reforms for the clerics).
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2 The model
We consider an economy with an autocrat and a clerical body. This body
is composed of individuals with different levels of conviction and commit-
ment to the faith. We assume that each member of the clerical class is
characterized by a parameter θ ∈ {θ, θ}. Clerics can thus be of two types.2
The first type is comprised of those with a rather superficial attachment to
the tenets of their religion and who have a comparatively low aversion to
secular reforms or iniquitous practices. They are therefore the most easily
seducible clerics for autocrats who carry out modernizing reforms or indulge
in corruption. Clerics of the second type have the opposite characteristics:
they take the basic principles of their faith seriously. As a consequence,
they are frustrated and angered by reforms, policies, and practices that
violate these principles as they understand them. Clerics are in proportion
µ = Prob(θ = θ) and 1 − µ = Prob(θ = θ) respectively. The mean value
of θ is Eθ = µθ+ (1− µ)θ. We compare two types of religions: centralized
and decentralized.
In the centralized religion, there is a church leader negotiating with the
autocrat on behalf of all the clerics, under the constraint that they are not
left worse off by supporting the autocrat. We focus on the Nash Bargaining
solution between the autocrat and the head of the church. The constraint is
that the autocrat needs to transfer enough resources so that each cleric can
be compensated by the church for his disutility of supporting the reforms
and the regime’s corruption. This implies that the centralized church has
the ability to overcome the coordination problem of the individual clerics.
This is in sharp contrast with the decentralized case, in which each cleric
decides on an individual basis whether to support the autocrat. They
make their decision independently after the autocrat has announced the
policies he wants to implements and the monetary transfer he will give to
his supporters. Depending on the autocrat’s offer, the clerics generally face
a coordination problem, which leads to a multiplicity of equilibria: it is
2In contrast Auriol and Platteau (2016) considers a continuum of clerics. The discrete
setting adopted here implies that it is technically easy to explore different forms of clerics
radicalization.
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possible that no cleric, or only the fraction µ of the moderate clerics, or all
of them choose to support the autocrat. To resolve the issue of equilibrium
selection we focus on the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, as explained in
the section below.
2.1 Decentralized religion
In the decentralized religion, each cleric has to individually choose whether
to support the autocrat, and hence compromise himself with the current
political power, or to distance himself from it (and implicitly express their
opposition). In the latter instance, the change of utility of the cleric is
posited to be nil. If he chooses to support the autocrat, the utility of the
cleric depends on his type θ ∈ {θ, θ}, on the probability that the autocrat
stays in power, p ≥ 0, on the monetary transfer or compensation which he
obtains from the autocrat, w ≥ 0, on the amount of the (secular) reforms
implemented by the same, α ≥ 0, and of the corruption of his regime,
β ≥ 0. That is,
U(θ, p, w, α, β) = pw − θV (α, β) (1)
with V (0, 0) = 0 and Vα(α, β) > 0, Vβ(α, β) > 0 and Vα,α(α, β) > 0,
Vβ,β(α, β) > 0, where the subscripts denote the partial derivative with
respect to α and β.
The situation we have in mind is that of a self-interested autocrat who
tries to seduce a cleric to support his policies. Term α represents the
amount of (legal/economic/social) reforms implemented by the ruler, such
as, for example, the creation of a secular school system, the introduction
of modern law codes dealing with administrative, criminal, commercial, or
personal status matters, the establishment of a modern judiciary system
with wide-ranging competencies, including on subjects traditionally cov-
ered by religious courts. Religious leaders tend to be opposed to legal,
economic, and social reforms that undermine their power, prestige, and
influence. An increase in α means that the autocrat undertakes more of
these reforms whereas a fall in α means that measures adopted by the au-
tocrat shape institutions in a way that makes them more in accordance
with the clerics’ preferences. Term β represents the degree of appropri-
7
ation of national wealth by the ruler and his clique, that is, the extent
of regime corruption (e.g., the percentage of the national wealth that the
autocrat embezzles). Religious clerics find it more difficult to support the
autocrat when he is more greedy, especially so if they are highly sensitive
to social injustice or strongly averse to inequality and corruption (that is,
if they have a high θ). If the cleric is of the more radical type, he severely
suffers (i.e., in term of reputation, prestige, authority, ideology) by sup-
porting the autocrat’s reforms and/or corruption, while if he is moderate
and rather soft on values and principles, such support comes with a small
cost. The utility of the clerics decreases with α and β, but the disutility of
reforms/corruption is larger when θ, which measures the ideological bias,
increases.
2.1.1 Stability of the autocracy with a decentralized religion
The clerics’ benefit of supporting the current political regime depends on
the autocrat staying in power, which occurs with probability p ≥ 0, while
the cost of supporting him is sunk (see equation 1). Since the probability
that the autocrat stays in power, p ≥ 0, depends on the proportion of clerics
that supports him, the benefit which a cleric obtains from supporting the
autocrat depends on the behavior of other clerics. This is a coordination
game. Since individuals of type θ ∈ {θ, θ} are identical, we focus on sym-
metrical equilibria where all individuals of type θ (respectively of type θ)
play in the same way. By contrast, since θ < θ, there are potentially many
cases where type θ and type θ might choose different strategies. In order to
get interesting solutions, in the sequel we make the following assumption.
µ >
θ
θ
. (2)
Under assumption (2), the clerics of type θ are the easiest ones to rally
to the autocrat’s cause. To understand the coordination problem, assume
that initially the clerics of the moderate type are the only ones who are
”seducible”. They still face a coordination problem. A cleric can either
decide to support the autocrat or not to support him. If he does not support
him, the cleric’s payoff is zero. If he is alone to support the autocrat, his
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payoff is −θV (α, β), whereas if he supports the autocrat and all the other
clerics of his type support him as well, his payoff is µw− θV (α, β). Let us
start by examining the case where µw ≤ θV (α, β). It is then evident that
p = 0 since no cleric will ever agree to support the autocrat: whatever the
behavior of the other clerics, the individual payoff of the cleric is always
negative when he supports the autocrat.3 As a consequence, a necessary
condition for the autocrat to get support from the moderate clerics is µw >
θV (α, β).
Under this assumption, there are two pure Nash equilibria and a mixed
one: there are the pure Nash equilibrium where nobody supports the au-
tocrat, the pure equilibrium where all moderate clerics support him and,
finally, there is a mixed equilibrium where the moderate cleric supports
him with probability θV (α,β)
µw
. This multiplicity of equilibria implies a se-
lection issue. Which one is going to be played in the end? Evolutionary
game theory suggests that the risk dominant equilibrium, and not neces-
sarily the payoff dominant one, will be the one to be played (see Kandori
et al. 1993, Young 1993, Fudenberg and Levine 1997).4 In what follows,
we therefore assume that the equilibrium that ends up to be selected is
the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. To understand this result intuitively,
assume that the autocrat chooses to offer w = θV (α,β)
µ
. If a religious cleric
of type θ considers supporting the autocrat regime, he will obtain an utility
equal to U(θ, p, w, α, β) = p θV (α,β)
µ
− θV (α, β). The highest possible value
of this utility is zero, meaning that it is 0 if all other clerics of his type also
play ”support the autocrat” (p = µ), and it is strictly negative otherwise.
We can infer that, if a religious cleric has doubts about the behavior of
3Assumption (2) implies: µw−θV (α, β) > µ (w − θV (α, β)). Therefore, if the utility
of a moderate cleric is negative under the assumption that all moderate clerics support
the autocrat, it is not possible that a radical cleric supports him. As a matter of fact,
the above inequality means that the RHS is negative, whichever the value of µ. As a
result, a radical cleric wil never find it profitable to support the autocrat even assuming
that all other clerics do it.
4This result is obtained in two different models. The first model, based on repli-
cator dynamics, predicts that a population is more likely to adopt the risk dominant
equilibrium than the payoff dominant equilibrium. The second model, based on best
response strategy revision and mutation, predicts that the risk dominant state is the
only stochastically stable equilibrium. The risk dominant equilibrium is the less risky
one in the sense that it has the largest basin of attraction.
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his fellow clerics, he will prefer not to support the autocrat. To overcome
the problem created by the uncertainty of the behavior of the other clerics,
the payoff of supporting the autocrat must be large enough. Evolutionary
game theory helps us to pin down what ”large enough” means. Let
w =
2θV (α, β)
µ
(3)
If the autocrat wants to get the support of the clerics of type θ he must
offer a wage larger than w. Indeed the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium
is the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium with full support from type θ
to the autocrat if and only if µw > 2θV (α, β). Symmetrically if µw ≤
2θV (α, β) the risk-dominant equilibrium is the pure Nash equilibrium with
zero support for the autocrat.5
In a similar manner, if the autocrat wants to gain the support of the
more radical clerics, he must offer a wage such that the risk-dominant
equilibrium is the payoff-dominant one when all types of clerics (i.e., both
type θ and θ) are enrolled. Let
w = 2θV (α, β). (4)
Under Assumption (2), it is easy to check that w > w.
Thus, if the autocrat wants to remain in power, he needs to choose
either w, in which case the probability of his regime survival is p = µ, or
w, in which case this probability is p = 1.
2.1.2 The autocrat’s optimal policy with a decentralized religion
The autocrat needs to set α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and to choose w ∈ {w,w}. He
maximizes his expected payoff. If he gains and keeps power, which occurs
with probability p ∈ {µ, 1}, he gets the gross benefit G(α, β), which is
a strictly increasing and concave function of α and of β: G(0, 0) = 0,
Gα(α, β) > 0, Gβ(α, β) > 0, Gα,α(α, β) ≤ 0 and Gβ,β(α, β) ≤ 0. He must
5If a cleric plays support ”s” and the others clerics play also ”s” then the payoff of
the cleric is µw−θV (α, β), while his payoff is −θV (α, β) if the other play abstain ”a”. If
he plays ”a” then the utility is 0, no matter what the other play. Playing ”s” is the risk
dominant equilibrium if and only if
( − θV (α, β))2 ≤ (µw − θV (α, β))2 (see Harsanyi
and Selten 1988).
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also pay w ∈ {w,w} to the fraction p ∈ {µ, 1} of clerics that supports him.
The timing of the co-option game with a decentralized clerical body is the
following.
1. The autocrat announces α, β and w.
2. A fraction p ∈ {0, µ, 1} of the clerics chooses to support the autocrat.
3. The autocrat implements α and β.
4. The autocrat is overthrown with probability 1− p, in which case he
does not get G(α, β) and the supportive clerics do not get w. If the
autocrat stays in power, he gets G(α, β) and the supportive clerics
get w.
In the model α ≥ 0 is the level of reforms, β ≥ 0 is the corruption level of
the autocrat, and w ≥ 0 the monetary transfer that he gives to the religious
clerics. For instance, let us assume that the country GDP is G(α). This
amount increases with the level of reforms α chosen by the autocrat. Being
greedy, he captures a fraction β ∈ [0, 1) of the national GDP, so that his
revenue is βG(α). In other words, β is not an amount of money: as this
example shows, it may correspond to the percentage of national wealth
accruing to the autocrat. The latter then needs to decide how much of his
revenue should be transferred to the clerics, that is, the level of w. If he
stays in power, his net revenue is therefore βG(α)−w. In the more general
case where the interaction of the corruption level, β, and the level of reform,
α, is left unspecified, the autocrat’s net revenue is G(α, β)−w. If he is not
able to climb to power, the autocrat gets his reservation utility normalized
to zero. If he is overthrown, he also gets zero as he loses everything that
he acquired while in power. Being self-interested, he focuses exclusively on
his own payoff which is related to his ability to stay in power. In other
words, he does not care about what happens to the rest of the economy if
he is removed. The objective function of the autocrat is therefore:
Ua(p, w, α, β) = p(G(α, β)− w), (5)
There are three possibilities.
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• If the autocrat chooses the corner solution p = 0, his utility is 0.
• If he chooses the interior solution µ, he solves: maxµ (G(α, β)− w)
so that w ≥ w. He maximizes over (α, β) the function Uaµ(α, β) =
µG(α, β)− 2θV (α, β).
• If he chooses the corner solution 1, the autocrat solves: maxG(α, β)−
w so that w ≥ w. He maximizes over (α, β) the function Ua1(α, β) =
G(α, β)− 2θV (α, β).
We can now deduce the result stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 At the optimum the autocrat chooses a combination of re-
forms and rent extraction, (α, β), so that
Gα(α, β)
Gβ(α, β)
=
Vα(α, β)
Vβ(α, β)
(6)
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.
Proposition 1 holds whether the autocrat chooses the corner solution
(p = 1) or the interior one (p = µ), that is, whether he decides to enlist the
entire clerical class or only a fraction of it. The interpretation of condition
(6) is the following. In order to maximize his utility, the autocrat chooses
a bundle of reforms and a measure of rent extraction so that the marginal
rate of substitution between α and β in his payoff function G(α, β) equals
the marginal rate of substitution between α and β in the clerics’ disutility
function, V (α, β). Any other allocation is inefficient since by changing
α and β, the autocrat is able to increase the value of his gross payoff G
without increasing the gross disutility of the clerics V . Alternatively, he
can decrease the gross disutility of the clerics V without diminishing his
gross payoff G.
At this stage, it is useful to conduct some comparative-static analysis.
In particular we would like to know whether β and α are complements or
substitutes once the principal optimizes his utility function. For instance,
if for some exogenous reason (e.g., technological progress) the return on
reforms increases, will the autocrat increase simultaneously both α and β,
or will he instead match an increase in α with a decrease in β? The next
proposition answer this question.
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Proposition 2 Let assume the function
Gβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
is non decreasing in α then
dβ
dα
> 0 (7)
Proof. See Appendix 5.2.
The condition in Proposition 2 is a sufficient condition, but it is not
necessary. In fact the result dβ
dα
> 0 still hold in many cases when it
is violated. In order to better understand the robustness of the α and
β complementarity result it is useful to illustrate it with the help of an
example. Let assume that β ∈ [0, 1) is the share of the national wealth,
G(α), that the autocrat diverts and keeps for himself with G ′(α) > 0 and
G ′′(α) ≤ 0. His gross utility function is G(α, β) = βG(α). Moreover, let us
assume that the gross disutility of the clerical class is V (α, β) = V(α)
1−β with
V ′(α) > 0 and V ′′(α) > 0. When the autocrat extracts a very large fraction
of the national wealth, it is thus very costly for the clerics to endorse his
policies. With such an example we are able to find necessary and sufficient
condition for β and α to vary in the same way. We show in the appendix
5.2 that
dβ
dα
> 0 ⇔ G
′(α)
G(α) −
G ′′(α)
G ′(α) >
V ′(α)
V(α) −
V ′′(α)
V ′(α) (8)
Since G(α) is concave, the LHS in equation (8) is always positive. By
contrast, the sign of the RHS in (8) is negative if V(α) is log-convex. We
can deduce that, when V(α) is log-convex, it is the case that dβ
dα
> 0. More
generally, this is always true as long as
Gβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
= G(α)(1−β)
2
V(α) is increasing in
α, which is equivalent to G
′(α)
G(α) ≥ V
′(α)
V(α) .
When V(α) is log-concave and the condition G′(α)G(α) ≥ V
′(α)
V(α) is violated,
there are instances in which β is non-increasing with α. We illustrate
this result with the help of power functions, which are log-concave. Let
V(α) = W αv
v
, and G(α) = K αg
g
with W > 0, K > 0 and v > 1 > g > 0. It
is easy to check that (8) holds with equality, so that dβ
dα
= 0. The autocrat’s
optimal extraction rate is (see Appendix 5.3):
β∗ =
v
v + g
. (9)
It is therefore independent of the level of reform (i.e., β∗ is independent of
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α). This example shows that at the optimum of the autocrat’s objective
function, α and β are not always strict complements.
Proposition 2 nonetheless implies that under a large range of parame-
ters, we have that dβ
dα
> 0. When the autocrat chooses to carry out more
reforms, he generally also chooses to extract more rents. If for some ex-
ogenous reason it is suddenly more profitable to implement reforms, the
autocrat simultaneously increases the level of reforms and his extraction
rate of the ensuing benefits. When there are more resources because of the
reforms, he seizes this opportunity to extract more rents as well. Symmetri-
cally, if for some exogenous reasons it becomes harder to push reforms and
extract rents (for instance because all the θs are translated upward), he
optimally decreases the level of reforms and the rate of his embezzlement.
This result is probably less innocuous than it may appear at first sight.
It actually provides an analytical elucidation of the main motivations be-
hind political opposition in many Muslim countries. As a matter of fact,
the grievances put forward by the rebels typically mix up corruption and
betrayal of the Islamic institutional legacy that legal and economic reforms
allegedly represent. This is amply attested, for example, by the dominant
themes of the anti-regime propaganda of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and
other countries. The unfortunate outcome is that the association between
corruption and ”modernization” contributes to discredit reforms conducive
to economic growth in the autocracies of the Muslim world.
We can now address more explicitly the problem of equilibrium selec-
tion. Since the analysis conducted in this section is quite general, it is
indeed not clear which solution, corner or interior, will dominate in prac-
tice. We prove below that both solutions can be optimal depending on the
cost and benefit of the decisions made by the autocrat, and on the distri-
bution of the clerical body between the two types. To make this point, it
is sufficient to consider an example.
Proposition 3 Assume that G(α, β) = βK α
g
g
, and V (α, β) = W
1−β
αv
v
, with
K,W > 0 and v > 1 > g > 0. The autocrat chooses the interior equilibrium
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pd = µ over the corner solution pd = 1 if and only if
µ
v
g >
θ
θ
. (10)
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
By virtue of Assumption 2, we know that µ > θ
θ
. We deduce that if
v is sufficiently close to g, then condition (10) holds. By contrast, since
µ < 1, µ
v
g becomes very small when either v becomes very large or g
very low so that condition (10) does not hold anymore. On the one hand,
when v is much larger than g, the autocrat prefers stability to progressive
reforms and to larger bribes (he picks the corner equilibrium). On the
other hand, when the difference between v and g is small, he prefers to
opt for reforms, which allow him to grab more bribes, over stability (he
picks the interior equilibrium). This implies that an increase in the return
on reforms, caused, say, by an increase in g resulting from technological
progress, will tend to lead to more political instability. Symmetrically, a
very low return on reforms will lead to political inertia. In particular if
there is a source of rent, such as natural resources, which is independent
of the level of reforms (i.e., if G(α) is not very sensitive to change in α), α
can be very low and the level of corruption quite high. For instance, in the
example of Proposition 3, if g is sufficiently small, condition (10) does not
hold and the autocrat picks the corner solution. When the reforms do not
increase his rents, reforming is not useful for the autocrat since it involves
costs (the clerics must be compensated for the disutility of reforms for
them) and no benefit. He then prefers to adopt very conservative policies
and enroll the whole clerical body rather than pushing for modernization.
While choosing a level of reforms close to 0, the autocrat can still embezzle
a fair share of the national rent.
There is a last and important issue that needs to be dealt with in the
context of our discussion of the case of decentralized religion: how does a
radicalization of the clerical body affect the regime’s stability. As it turns
out, the answer depends on the form taken by religious radicalization. Rad-
icalization of the clerics in the form of an increase in v (i.e., an increase
in the marginal cost of the reforms for them) or of a decrease in µ, (i.e., a
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decrease in the proportion of moderate clerics), will tend to lead to more po-
litical stability and cause a sharp decrease in reforms: the autocrat adopts
conservative policies in order to preserve stability. This result means that
the autocrat never chooses to make up for a higher cost or a smaller benefit
of reforms by raising the material privileges of the clerics to such an extent
that more reforms are adopted. In fact, he may even choose to reduce these
privileges at the new equilibrium. Radicalization of the clerics may take on
a third form, however: the radical clerics may become even more radical,
implying that their degree of aversion to what they consider bad practices
or policies increases and the gap between the preferences of the two types of
clerics is enlarged. When this happens, the ruler reacts by adopting more
rather than less reforms and by increasing rather than decreasing corrup-
tion. As a result, political stability is reduced. The underlying mechanism
is as follows: if the radical clerics become more radical, it is more costly to
purchase their support. The autocrat will then choose to concentrate his
efforts on the enlisting of the more moderate clerics, which enables him to
carry on with more reforms.
It is worth noticing that the transition between the stable and the un-
stable equilibria is never smooth: at the threshold, a marginal increase in
g or in θ causes a jump from the full support equilibrium to the interior
equilibrium, and symmetrically for a marginal variation in v or µ (i.e., a
jump from an unstable to a stable equilibrium).
We now turn to the study of a centralized religion.
2.2 Centralized religion
In the centralized religion, a vertical chain of command prevails. The clerics
belong to a ”church” and have to be obedient to its hierarchy. We denote
the cleric who is at the head of the church by θc ∈ {θ, θ}. He is the one
to decide whether the church supports the autocrat or not. If the head of
the church chooses to support the autocrat, he will have to compensate its
clerical members who dislike the reforms and the corruption of the ruling
elite. He has to ensure that in equilibrium they all get a positive utility.
Individualized compensations are possible because the authority structure
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is well-informed about the preferences of each and every church member. In
a vertical religious organization, which stresses the importance of obedience
and rely on confession, members cannot easily conceal their aspirations and
frustrations. A transfer scheme ensuring that the church’s members behave
in a consistent way and fully support the autocrat, if this is the decision
made by the hierarchy, may therefore be designed and implemented. In
other words, the centralized structure helps the members of the clerical
body to overcome their collective action problem.
What the above implies is that, with a centralized church, the autocrat
will have to give away in rents a minimum of EθV (α, β). This minimum
ensures that all church members can be compensated for the disutility of the
reforms undertaken and the embezzlement committed by the ruling clique.
Yet, it does not guarantee that the head of the church will be willing to
himself support the autocrat. They both bargain over the rents generated
by the reforms and the bribes, and they are both selfish. We focus on the
Nash bargaining solution.6 The bargaining power of the church’s leader,
denoted by c ∈ [0, 1], is assumed to be exogenously given. The power of
the autocrat is 1− c ∈ [0, 1]. In case of disagreement, the autocrat and the
church’s head get their status quo utility: their disagreement point is zero.
The problem to be solved is, therefore, the following:
max
w,α,β
(
G(α, β)− w
)1−c(
w − θcV (α, β)
)c
(11)
s.t. w ≥ EθV (α, β)
Solving this problem, we are able to establish the following result.
Proposition 4 Let θc ∈ {θ, θ} be the head of the organization representing
the centralized religion. The level of reforms, αc, implemented by the au-
tocrat, his level of corruption, βc, and the monetary transfers, wc, received
by the religious organisation are characterized by the following conditions.
(i) Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
=
Gβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
6The bargaining model presented by Nash (1950) can be formulated as a Nash Bar-
gaining Product (see Binmore et al. 1986).
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(ii) Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
= θc and wc = (1 − c)θcV (αc, βc) + cG(αc, βc) if Eθ <
cG(α
c,βc)
V (αc,βc)
+ (1− c)Gα(αc,βc)
Vα(αc,βc)
(iii) cG(α,β)
V (α,β)
+ (1− c)Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
= Eθ and wc = EθV (αc, βc) otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 5.4.
Condition (i) in Proposition 4 is the same as equation (6) in Proposi-
tion 1. It simply states that an efficient allocation of the autocrat’s effort
between reform and corruption must equalize his marginal rate of substitu-
tion between the two with the marginal rate of substitution of the (gross)
clerics’ disutility. This condition is an efficiency condition, and it must
therefore be valid whatever the type of policy implemented, or the way it
is decided.7 Proposition 1 thus remains true under conditions of religious
centralization. Proposition 2 is therefore also true in the centralized case.
Under autocratic systems legitimized by religion the level of reforms and of
embezzlements are in most cases complement: modernization and regime
corruption tend to be intimately intertwined.
Case (ii) in Proposition 4 holds when θc is relatively large, that is, when
the head of the church tends to be hostile to the autocrat. For instance, it
always holds when θc = θ.8 When θc is large, the autocrat has to abandon
large rents to the church in order to win the support of its leader. The
monetary transfer is so large that the individual rationality constraint of
the members of the church is easily met: the constraint wc ≥ EθV (αc, βc)
is not binding.
Case (iii) can hold only when θc = θ. To see this point, consider the
limit case where the church head has almost no bargaining power (i.e., c
is close to 0). For Case (ii) to hold, the condition becomes Eθ < θc. It
implies that with the binomial distribution and c close to zero, Case (ii)
holds if and only if θc = θ. Case (iii) holds otherwise, that is, if θc = θ.
7This result continues to hold when the autocrat efficiently bargains over reforms
and bribes with the head of the church. If it does not hold, indeed, it is possible by
changing α and β to either increase the utility of the autocrat without increasing the
disutility of the church leader, or to decrease the disutility of the church leader without
decreasing the utility of the autocrat, a contradiction.
8The proof is straightforward: bearing in mind that G(α,β)V (α,β) > max{θc, Eθ}, we have
that cG(α,β)V (α,β) + (1− c)Gα(α,β)Vα(α,β) = c
G(α,β)
V (α,β) + (1− c)θc > θc.
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The problem of the autocrat is thus to transfer enough resources to the
church to be able to buy the support of the average clerical member: the
individual rationality constraint of the clerical body is binding.
We just have shown that, for Case (iii) to hold, it is necessary that θc =
θ. We now show that this condition is not sufficient. To prove this result,
we consider again the example of G(α, β) = βK α
g
g
, and V (α, β) = W α
v
v(1−β) ,
with v > 1 > g > 0 and K,W > 0. Since Case (i) in Proposition 4 is the
same as equation (6) in Proposition 1, we have βc = v
v+g
independently of
αc (see the proof in Appendix 5.3). Moreover, we can check that
(ii) αc =
(
K
W
gv
(v + g)2
1
θc
) 1
v−g
if Eθ <
(
1 + c
v − g
g
)
θc
(iii) αc =
(
K
W
gv
(v + g)2
1 + cv−g
g
Eθ
) 1
v−g
otherwise
Let us assume that θc = θ. Case (ii) is optimal if Eθ <
(
1 + cv−g
g
)
θ,
which is equivalent to θ <
(
1 + c
1−µ
v−g
g
)
θ. There is hence a whole range
of parameter values so that Case (ii) still holds when θc = θ.
It is straightforward to check that the amounts of reforms and cor-
ruption decrease with θc in Case (ii) and with Eθ in Case (iii). In these
circumstances, the autocrat would like to control the nomination process of
the head of the church. Case (ii) corresponds to the medieval struggle be-
tween secular and Christian religious authorities in Europe. Tensions were
then continuous between Rome and the Christian kings. On the other hand,
the situation of proximity between the autocrat and the church, which was
a phenomenon of early modern Europe rather than of the Middle Ages, is
well captured by Case (iii). Finally, to move from Case (ii) to Case (iii),
the autocrat is willing to pay up to the difference in its rents.
With national churches, the autocrat’s decisions tend to be driven by
the average cleric. By contrast, in the case of a decentralized religion, they
are driven by the marginal cleric. As we show in the next subsection, this
difference matters a great deal.
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2.3 Comparison of centralized vs decentralized reli-
gions: reforms, corruption and stability
In this section, we would like to compare how the optimal mix of reforms
and bribes chosen by the autocrat to maximise his utility differs depending
on whether the religion is centralized or decentralized. In particular, is
one structure more conducive to secular reforms (and therefore generally
more corruption) than the other? The next, related issue is which structure
leads to more political stability. In order to conduct our comparisons of
equilibria, we start from a situation where the only difference between the
two autocracies is the structure of their religion. In other words, the cost
and benefit of reforms and embezzlement of national wealth as well as the
distribution of the clerical body between the two types are the same in the
two economies.
Let us first compare the stability of the two regimes. With a centralized
religion, the autocrat negotiates directly with the head of the church. He
needs to transfer enough resources not only to seduce him personally but
also to compensate the church’s members for their dislike of his reforms and
corruption. In exchange of these rents, he gets the support of the hierarchy
and the full clerical body as well. In equilibrium, therefore, the system
is fairly stable. By contrast, under a decentralized religion, the autocrat
has to gain the support of each cleric individually. Since it is costly to
enroll the whole clerical body (i.e., the transfer must be large enough to
seduce the most radical type), the autocrat may choose to co-opt only a
fraction of them, µ in our setup. Let pd denote the probability that the
autocrat stays in power under a decentralized religion. We deduce that
everything else being equal, centralized religions lead to more stability than
decentralized religions: pd ≤ 1.9 It is indeed more easy for an autocrat to
enrol an entire clerical body when its members obey to a centralized church
authority than when they are allowed to behave in relative independence
and in the absence of a collective discipline. To the extent that the clerics
can transform themselves into effective leaders of popular rebellions if frus-
9See Proposition 5 in Auriol and Platteau (2016) for a generalization of this result
to the continuous case.
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trations against the regime run too high, political instability is more likely
to be observed in countries dominated by a decentralized religion than in
those where a centralized religious structure is in place. This prediction is
borne out by Blaydes and Chaney (2013) who have compared the degree of
political instability in the Western Christian and the Muslim worlds from
800 to 1600. They find that on average political rulers in Christianity had
significantly longer tenure than rulers in Islam, and the duration gap is
widening as time elapses. Moreover, duration for Catholic kings was the
longest when they started to create national churches and move towards
absolutism.
We next aim to compare the amounts of reforms and corruption in
periods of political stability. Toward that purpose, we compare the values
of α and β chosen by the autocrat under a decentralized religion when
he opts for political stability with the values obtained under a centralized
religion. As analyzed in Proposition 3 in Section 2.1, the autocrat may
chooses pd = 1 under a decentralized religion.
Proposition 5 Let G(α, β) = βG(α) and V (α, β) = V(α)
1−β with β ∈ [0, 1).
Let condition (8) holds and let V′(α)V(α) ≥ G ′(α)G(α) . In conditions of political
stability, the level of reformist effort and the amount of corruption under
a decentralized religion, αd and βd, are always smaller than the amounts
obtained under a centralized one, αc and βc.
pd = 1⇔ αd ≤ αc and βd ≤ βc (12)
Proof. See Appendix 5.5
Decentralized religions are less conducive to reforms and corruption
than centralized ones in conditions of political stability, that is, when all
the clerics are bought off by the autocrat under both types of religious or-
ganization. This result seems intuitive when the religious authority is close
to the autocrat. More surprisingly, however, it is also true when the clerical
authority is antagonistic to the ruler. As a matter of fact, buying stability
in the presence of a decentralized clerical body is comparatively costly be-
cause he must seduce the most radical cleric. Under a centralized religion,
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by contrast, he must only convince the head of the church and transfer
enough resources to buy the average cleric. Since the compensation unam-
biguously increases with the amounts of reforms and corruption, stability
comes with reform inertia (a bad outcome) and moderation of embezzle-
ment (a good outcome) when the religion is decentralized. The structural
heterogeneity of the clerical body is clearly what drives the autocrat to
better take account of the clerics’ preferences.
If we relax the assumption of political stability, is it still true that
a decentralized religion mitigates secular reforms and corruption? The
answer is not necessarily: there are equilibria where, everything else being
equal except the type of religious organization, the decentralized religion
yields larger amounts of reforms and corruption but at the cost of greater
instability. To prove this result, it is sufficient to find an example where it
is indeed the case.
Let G(α, β) = βK α
g
g
, and V (α, β) = W α
v
v(1−β) , with v ≥ 1 > g > 0 and
K,W > 0. Let v and g be such that in the decentralized case the autocrat
prefers the interior equilibrium to the corner one (i.e., 10 does not hold).
We deduce that αd =
(
µ
θ
K
W
gv
(v+g)2
) 1
v−g
(see equation 32 in the appendix).
Let θc = θ so that Condition (ii) in Proposition 4 holds. We deduce
that αc =
(
K
W
gv
(v+g)2
1
θ
) 1
v−g
. Comparing αd and αc, it is straightforward
to check that αd > αc ⇔ µ > θ
θ
, which is always true by Assumption
(2). There is therefore a whole range of parameter values such that the
autocrat dealing with a decentralized religious organization carries out more
progressive reforms and indulges in more absolute embezzlement than the
same autocrat dealing with a centralized church. To achieve these relatively
large amounts of reforms and bribes, he disregards a fraction of the clerics.
This is not an option with a centralized organization, which is inclusive by
nature. If the church is dominated by clerics who are deeply attached to
religious principles (the radical clerics), the reform path will be slow and
embezzlement limited.
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3 Illustrative Examples: lessons from Islam
We are now ready to embark upon a journey throughout the modern Mus-
lim world. The following discussion of country and regime case studies does
not pretend to offer a rigorous testing of the above theory. More modestly,
it serves the purpose of illustrating its most important propositions and
showing that it can be used as a powerful analytical narrative to throw
light on political and societal processes in which autocrats and religious
clerics occupy center stage. We start by discussing the main assumptions
of our paper: religious clerics can be brought into submission by means
of material privileges, and some religions, such as Islam, are decentralized
while others, such as Catholicism or Eastern Orthodox Christianity, possess
a centralized organization.
3.1 Corruptible religious leaders?
The idea that the men of religion can be bought off by the men of power
may appear odd or even shocking. There is nonetheless ample evidence
attesting that clerics may be quite responsive to material incentives. This
has been expressed in the starkest and most cynical manner by Adolf Hitler
when he made his case for a concordat with the Catholic church (the Re-
ichskonkordat signed in September 1933) in the hope of gaining legitimacy
from the Vatican and the German episcopate for his totalitarian national-
socialist regime. In his own words: ”We should trap the priests by their
notorious greed and self-indulgence. We shall thus be able to settle every-
thing with them in perfect peace and harmony... Why should we quarrel?
They will swallow anything in order to keep their material advantages....”
(cited from Lewy, 1964: 26). The centralized organization of the Catholic
church has played a key role in this instance. As a matter of fact, Ger-
man Catholic bishops were generally opposed to the Reich yet the Vatican
persuaded them to manifest their allegiance to the Nazi regime as a way
to keep their educational and social institutions running (Falconi, 1967;
Lapide, 1967).10
10It soon became apparent, however, that Hitler preferred intimidation and violence
to co-option as a tactic to tame opposition. When such conditions obtain, our analytical
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Situations in which the clergy surrenders to autocrats are easily found
in other parts of the Christian world, including in countries where Eastern
Orthodoxy is dominant. Just to cite one example, the Russian Orthodox
church has collaborated with the tsarist regime to such an extent that it
ended up being largely discredited in the eyes of the population. Sergey
Witte, the first prime minister following the Constitutional Manifesto of
1905 and a remarkable actor and observer of his times, thus wrote: “Our
church has turned into a dead, bureaucratic institution, and its services are
conducted to celebrate not God in heaven but the earthly gods” (cited from
Obolonsky, 2003: 137). Alexander Obolonsky agrees with this judgement
and stresses that the church hierarchy showed almost complete indifference
toward the lot of common people, being “satisfied with an ostentatious
display of piety” (137).
In Islam, there is abundant evidence that, like Catholic priests and bish-
ops, the clerics can be bought off with the help of material and non-material
incentives. Here, we are content with citing one of the best historians of
Islam who, referring to the Ottoman Empire, writes:
The biographies of scholars show that, with the elaboration of a
bureaucratic hierarchy, interest in careers outweighed genuine
piety and learning. The influence of entrenched families en-
abled them to promote their children into the higher grades of
the educational and judicial hierarchies without having reached
the proper preliminary levels, while theological students who
could not find patronage were excluded. In the course of the
eighteenth century the ulama became a powerful, politically
conservative pressure group. As servants of the state the ulama
no longer represented the interests of the people, nor protected
them from the abuses of political power. No longer did they
represent a transcendental Islamic ideal opposed to worldly cor-
ruption. Their integration into the Ottoman empire made them
simply the spokesmen of Ottoman legitimacy (Lapidus, 2002:
268).
apparatus is of limited relevance.
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Adeel Malik confirms this observation when he points out that the ”cozy re-
lationship” between the religious clerics (meaning not only the ulama but
also the Sufi orders) and the sultan translated into significant economic
and political privileges for the former (2012: 8). At the highest level, such
privileges consisted of offices involving lucrative functions which included
revenue generation and the administration of religious endowments that
controlled vast tracts of land. Because the associated incomes were exempt
from taxes, religious appointments were highly coveted, and religious fami-
lies possessing long-standing honourable ancestries competed for the offices
as well as for titles and tax farms. When they succeeded, they became a
core component of the Ottoman nobility and a linchpin of provincial ad-
ministration (Hourani, 1991: 224-25; 1993; Coulson, 1964). It is therefore
not surprising that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a great
mass of religious clerics have been willing to antagonise the ruler. This
attitude is deemed justified by the need to avoid civil disorder and the
ensuing chaos. In Islam, there existed no constitutional machinery, and
in particular no independent judiciary, to guarantee that the ruler would
not abuse his powers. The doctrine actually recognised its total impotence
by enunciating the principle that obedience was due to the political power
whatever its nature, and that even the most impious and tyrannical regime
was preferable to civil strife (Coulson, 1964: 129-30, 133-4).
3.2 Centralization in European Christianity, Decen-
tralization in Islam: Historical roots
In Christianity, after the Western Roman Empire collapsed in 476, the new
states of Western Europe were too weak to block corporate organizations,
which included not only guilds and cities but also religious orders and the
Catholic church (Kuran, 2017, section 3). From very early on, therefore,
autonomous entities could develop with possibly diverging interests from
the state. This said, depending on specific circumstances, their relative
influence was more or less constrained by political power. While in Eastern
Christianity, the state was able to act most assertively in a continuous
manner, the history of state-church relations in the Western Christian world
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did not follow a linear path. Yet, from the 17-18th centuries onwards, when
modern European states were formed or consolidated, the relationships
between political (absolutist) rulers and the church became more stable and
less antagonistic. As a result of intensified cooperation, national religions
became important vehicles of state legitimacy, as reflected in the famous
principle ’cuius regio eius religio’. Consistent with the theory, absolutism
was a period of intense reforms: ending of feudal partitioning, consolidation
of power in the hands of the monarch, rise of the state along with its
professional standing army and rationalized bureaucracy, and codification
of state laws designed for uniform enforcement across the national territory.
The history of the relationship between religion and politics in Euro-
pean Christianity contrasts with the situation observed in the lands of
Islam. This is because, since after the times of the Prophet, religion be-
came unambiguously dominated by temporal rulers in these lands. There,
unlike what was observed in Western Christianity, the state had both the
motivation and capability to prevent the emergence and consolidation of
autonomous organisations (Kuran, 2017, section 3). As a consequence, no
Muslim church was established (Lewis, 2002; Greif, 2006: 206), and a long
tradition of political autocracy has prevailed until today.
Because Islam is a decentralized religion without a church structure, it
does not offer a clear-cut picture regarding the extent of religious support
for a political regime. In the name of the fundamental principle that Muslim
believers directly relate to God, they do not have to obey to a church hier-
archy. The clerics cannot be brought to a centralized negotiation process
with an autocrat. A wide variety of situations have been observed consis-
tent with our theoretical predictions. The following case studies gleaned
from Platteau (2009, 2011, and 2017: chap. 6), illustrate them. Polit-
ical instability characterised Sadat’s Egypt and Bhutto’s Pakistan where
radical clerics constituted a continuous threat to the regime. By contrast,
Boumedienne’s Algeria and Nimeiri’s or Bashir’s Sudan, achieved a fair
measure of political stability thanks to the complete or near-complete alle-
giance of the religious clerics, and the presence of abundant gaz resources
in Algeria.
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3.3 Case study 1: Egypt under Sadat
Upon accession to power (1970), Anwar al-Sadat immediately sought legit-
imacy from the official institutions of Islam, and he never really departed
from this attitude. If the official ulama from al-Azhar were under control
and the ruling elite had nothing to fear from them, the same could not
be said of the Muslim Brothers whose leaders had antagonised Nasser and
been thrown into jail or forced to go underground. Sadat decided to re-
lease them gradually during the years 1971-75, with the official objective
of driving them ”to cooperate in the service of the country”. In reality, he
wanted to broaden his constituency and consolidate his power in the face
of a rival faction that had privileged links to the ”deep state” of Egypt (the
army, the police, and the intelligence service). Moreover, he intended to
use the Brothers against two political forces that continued to threaten his
rule even after he succeeded in eliminating the above faction: the forces
of the political left, consisting of Marxists, Socialists and Nasserites, who
criticised his economic liberalisation policies, and those of the extreme re-
ligious right, the ”Jama’at Islamiyya” (the Islamic Group) and the ”Takfir
wa-l Hijra” (Excommunication and Exodus) (Cook, 2012: 124-7).
Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to re-establish its press to proselytize
openly and to organise freely on university campuses. He also named a
lawyer with strong ties to the Brothers as the new head of the Social-
ist Youth Organisation of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), and a promi-
nent Islamist as director of the Professional Associations Syndicate. All
these measures had a profound influence on Egyptian politics, and the
Brotherhood gradually took control of the prestigious engineers, doctors,
lawyers, scientists, and pharmacists professional associations (Cook, 2012:
123, 125). The so-called neo-Muslim Brothers, whose opinions were voiced
in al-Da’wa, were in complete accordance with the official ideology of Sadat
when they fought against communism, equalled to atheism. Their demand
for the gradual Islamisation of the Egyptian state was never neatly dis-
missed, and was sometimes apparently encouraged, by state authorities
(Ramadan, 1993: 164-78; Kepel, 2005: 105-31).
In spite of his shrewd political manoeuvring, Sadat was playing with
27
fire because the people of Egypt expected him to end the country’s hu-
miliation at the hands of the Israelis. The success of the demonstrations
initiated by students of all hues, including Islamists, Nasserists, and Left-
ists, made it clear that the opposition was far broader than the regime
admitted and that it was difficult to disentangle demands for democratic re-
forms from demands for military redress (Cook, 2012: 129-30). To counter
these threats, the authorities did not hesitate to encourage religious mil-
itant movements and even support them, organisationally and financially
(Ayubi, 1991: 74-5). The movement called Islamic Community started to
organize government-sponsored summer camps. These camps were held
with increasing frequency during the post-1973 years and in 1974, Sadat
managed to organise the takeover of the Egyptian Student Union by the Is-
lamic Community. He also issued a decree providing that the Union’s chief
purpose was ”to deepen religious values among the students” (Dreyfuss,
2005: 154).
Two main policies followed by Sadat were to eventually seal his fate,
despite the temporary rise of his popularity as a result of the successful
crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian troops in the opening phase of the
1973 war against Israel. First, his policy of economic opening and liber-
alisation, known as the ”infitah” (opening), widened the gap between the
masses and an emerging class of new wealthy businessmen tightly connected
to the regime. When subsidies on basic necessities were reduced at the be-
hest of the International Monetary Fund, causing suffering among the lower
and lower middle classes, the response from the latter was swift and took
Sadat off guard. What came to be known as the ”bread riots” forced him to
backtrack. The deteriorating economic situation, rising inequality, and the
unabashed corruption of the regime brought added fuel to the people’s and
militants’ grievances. In the food riots of January 1977, bearded youths
set fire to nightclubs and cabarets, considering that the belly-dancing and
other sinful activities around these places were a serious affront to Islam,
especially during the holy month of Ramadan (Ayubi, 1991, p. 75). The
religious symbolism and idiom of the Islamist movements increasingly be-
came ”the language through which the petite bourgeoisie and lower classes
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expressed not only their resentment of corruption, decadence and inequal-
ity, but also their hostility towards the very state machine that embodied
these evils” (Gilsenan, 1982: 225-6, as cited by Ayubi, 1991: 80).
Second, in the aftermath of the 1973 war, Sadat chose to strike peace
with Israel through the privileged mediation of the United States. The
warming of relations between Egypt and the United States went hand in
hand with the development of a close personal relationship between Sadat
and Henry Kissinger, then the American Secretary of State. These daring
moves were bitterly resented by many Egyptians, especially so because they
coincided with a Westernisation of the society for the benefit of a narrow
elite generally linked to the clique in power. Particularly vocal was the
opposition by the Islamists and the Nasserists (Cook, 2012, pp. 135-43). In
contrast to the enduring alliance between official Islam and the autocratic
regime of Sadat, the climate of cooperation with the Brotherhood sharply
deteriorated after the negotiation of the peace treaty with Israel.11 The neo-
Muslim Brothers openly challenged the regime, calling for an abrogation of
the treaty, a return to military options regarding Israel, and non-alignment
(Cook, 2012: 151-2). As for more radical Islamist groups, such as the
Jama’at, they went much further by denouncing the Islamic illegitimacy of
the ”iniquitous prince”: making peace with Israel is ”munkar”, meaning
absolute evil or abomination, and its prosecution is the first commandment
of Islam (Kepel, 2005: 163).
In an attempt to pacify the Islamists, Sadat amended Article 2 of the
constitution, now proclaiming that ”Islam is the religion of the state and
Arabic its official language”, and that ”principles of Islamic law are the
principal source of legislation”. He also introduced the ominous ”Law of
Shame” aimed at criminalising all forms of opposition to the government:
almost any act of dissidence became interpretable as violation of public,
11After Sadat accepted to go to Jerusalem and to sign a peace treaty with Israel in
March 1979, the opposition to his rule became more bold, open and broad-based than
it had ever been, including on the benches of the People’s Assembly. However, the
ulama belonging to the official establishment came to Sadat’s rescue when the sheikh of
al-Azhar issued a fatwa in May 1979, called the ”Islamic Opinion” and the ”Religious
Legal Verdict”, to provide religious sanctioning of the peace treaty and the Camp David
Agreement (Ramadan, 1993: 169; Kepel, 2005: 51, 116; Marsot, 2007: 163-5). It
cancelled a previous al-Azhar’s fatwa that forbade peace with Israel (1962).
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religious, and national morals, and therefore as a criminal offence (Cook,
2012: 153). At the same time, Sadat adopted the public posture of a
pious leader (Ayubi, 1991: 75), which only had the effect of causing sar-
castic comments about the hypocritical attitude of a ”Believer-President”
who ruled over a deeply corrupt regime but perfunctorily acted as a good
Muslim. When, under the impulse of the Brotherhood, a coalition of Is-
lamic groups came together to seek Sadat’s overthrow, it was clear that
the regime had nurtured ”the snake that would later strike it” (Kepel,
2005: 138). Sadat was eventually assassinated by an extremist from the
”al-Jihad” (Sacred Combat) group, of which many members previously be-
longed to the Jama’at (Ibrahim, 1995: 53-68; Kepel, 2005: 16, 51-9, 105-68;
Marsot, 2007: chaps. 6-7; Cook, 2012; 147-56).
3.4 Case study 2: Pakistan under Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was initially a modern, left-oriented politician with so-
cial democratic ideas. This did not prevent him, however, from participat-
ing in the designing of the 1973 constitution, which declared Islam to be the
state religion (Article 2), provided that all existing laws were to be brought
into conformity with the injunctions of Islam (Article 227), and prescribed
that the tenets of Islam and the Quran should be taught in schools (Article
31). In an attempt to defeat the political opposition (united under the
so-called Pakistan National Alliance) which rebelled against its arrogant
authoritarianism and called for the enforcement of the Islamic system of
government, he declared gambling and horse racing illegal, banned the sale
and use of alcohol, and declared Friday as the weekly holiday (Abbas, 2005:
84-5). Moreover, to destabilize the regime of Muhammad Daoud who seized
power in Kabul through a state coup on 17 July 1973, Bhutto did not hesi-
tate to use right-wing Islamic dissidents from Afghanistan (Roy, 1993: 495;
Abbas, 2005: 81). In the conflict of Kashmir, too, Bhutto adopted a pro-
Muslim populist stance: his strong anti-India case -Kashmir should either
be attached to Pakistan or be an independent state- was made in the name
of Islam. In all these cases, we should bear in mind that Bhutto was under
the powerful pressure of the army which never digested his taking over of
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political power after his predecessor, General Yayha Khan, was overthrown
in the aftermath of the disastrous civil war which led to the independence
of Eastern Bengal (Bangladesh) (Platteau, 2017: chap. 6). Moreover, the
proximity of the army to the religious right exacerbated the threat that the
latter raised for Bhutto, forcing him to increase his co-option effort.
Bhutto’s proclivity to appeal to Islam and advocate the Islamization of
the country out of political expediency became increasingly apparent over
the years of his rule. He thus surrendered to the demands of a radical
Islamist movement, the ”Jamaat-i-Islami” (founded by Mawdudi), to ex-
clude the Ahmadi sect from the Muslim community (Abbas, 2005: 81-2).
He took over the religious parties’ agenda, encouraged the expression of sec-
tarian opinion, and tilted toward an obscurantist interpretation of Islam,
partly for reasons connected to his economic and national security agendas
(Haqqani, 2005: 107-9). Thus, on the occasion of the Arab oil embargo
(1973), Bhutto wanted Pakistan to benefit from the flow of petrodollars,
and this required that the country’s Islamic identity be emphasised. The
Islamic summit conference was hosted in Lahore, enabling Pakistan to take
the lead in creating permanent structures for the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC).
Perhaps the greatest flaw of Bhutto’s rule was his decision to place
General Zia ul-Haq at the top of the army, over the heads of half a dozen
senior and more deserving generals. An obsequious but ambitious man,
Zia was also a devout Muslim closely connected to several Islamists by
virtue of his social and family origins. Not only did he bear responsibility
for the arrest and execution of Bhutto (in 1978) after proclaiming martial
law in cahoots with the head of the secret services (General Ghulam Jilani
Khan) but he did more than any other Pakistani ruler to destroy the secular
character of the country and to Islamize the bureaucracy, the army, and
the education system. Because he favoured the growing influence of a
reactionary strand of Islam, the Deoband school (close to Wahhabism), he
was responsible for a dramatic subversion of Pakistani institutions.
The central lesson of Bhutto’s rule is therefore that, in order to re-
main in power and withstand the hostile pressures of the military, he made
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concessions to men of religion that contradicted his initially proclaimed
ideals. These concessions, however, were not sufficient to compensate for
the inequitable economic policies that he enacted and for the rent-seeking,
corruption and state-organized racketeering that he tolerated. Since the
radical clerics resented these practices as deeply unfair, they were or be-
came too costly to buy off. Cooperating with them in any sustainable
manner was impossible, especially so because Bhutto continued to be re-
garded as an ambiguous leader travelling between religious and secular
values. Partial religious co-option therefore prevailed with the attendant
effect of political instability.
3.5 Case study 3: Sudan under Nimeiri and Bashir
A new constitution established Sudan as a secular state in 1973, implying
that in civil and criminal matters civilians’ behaviour was governed by a
secular law, while personal and family matters were covered by sharia law
for Muslims and customary law for tribal populations of the south. Like in
the case of Egypt, the combination of state corruption and liberalisation
policies that caused abrupt increases in the price of oil, bread and sugar
prompted widespread riots by students and angry consumers, and it inten-
sified political opposition (Jok, 2007: 72-73). Nimeiri reacted by getting
closer to Islamic factions and by inviting into his government (in 1977)
two prominent Islamic politicians, including Hassan al-Turabi, leader of
the Muslim Brotherhood and founder of the National Islamic Front (NIF)
whom he had previously imprisoned. Appointed attorney-general, Turabi
exerted steady pressure for the Islamic reform of the legal system (Lapidus,
1988: 859; Jok, 2007: 74).
In 1982, at the risk of losing his secular support base, he began to
dismantle the accord of Addis-Ababa (1972) which had ended the first
north-south civil war triggered by the brutal Arabization and Islamization
policies of Ibrahim Abbud (1958-1964). He actually wanted to please Is-
lamist groups such as the NIF which regarded the south as a challenge to
Islam. In September 1983, Nimeiri completely reversed his initial secular
policy by declaring an ”Islamic revolution” and transforming the Sudanese
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state into an Islamic republic to be governed by Islamic law, with no ex-
emption for non-Muslim regions. Sudanese law was to be immediately
reformed according to the sharia, and the so-called September laws gave
rise to highly publicised public executions, amputations of limbs for theft,
and lashing for alcohol consumption (Jok, 2007: 74-6). Similarly to what
Zia ul-Haq did in Pakistan, Nimeiri demanded an oath of unconditional
allegiance from all members of the civil service and judiciary, thereby caus-
ing the departure of prominent secularists and the dominance of the civil
service, the army and the financial sector by Islamists (de Waal, 1997: 88).
Members of the NIF and Muslim Brotherhood were left free to gain influ-
ence within the civil service, intelligence, and institutions of government
that deal with education and welfare.
More ominously still, Nimeiri let Turabi draft the Criminal Bill (pre-
sented to parliament in 1988) which included an ominous provision for out-
lawing apostasy sufficiently vague to allow its application to be politically
determined (de Waal, 1997: 91; Meredith, 2005: 356-7). The execution of
Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the founder of the Republican Brothers, on
the charge of apostasy (1984), offers a perfect illustration of the cynical
use that can be made of the Bill. The fact is that ”opposition to an Is-
lamic government can be, and has been, defined as an act of apostasy”,
and this was directed not only against secular Muslims and other political
opponents (e.g., communists), but also against other Islamic sects (such as
the Khatmiyya, Ansar and Ansar-Sunna) that were regarded as a threat
to the ruling clique (Johnson, 2003: 129).
Brigadier (later General) Omer el Bashir, who seized power in 1989,
immediately professed his goal of creating a theocratic rather than a demo-
cratic state, in the mist of the mounting influence of the party of the Muslim
Brothers. In no time he re-created the apparatus of Nimeiri’s police state
in more extreme form, and he promulgated the Sudanese Penal Code of
1991, which included the aforementioned provision on the crime of apos-
tasy. He also formed his own Islamic militia, the People’s Defence Force
(PDF), and its training was made compulsory for civil servants, teachers,
students and higher-education candidates. All rights of free expression and
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belief were outlawed, and public protests in objection to the government’s
policies were considered not only as a treasonable offence, but also as an
insult to Islam (Johnson, 2003: 128; Meredith, 2005: 589; Jok, 2007: 162).
The Arabization and Islamization policies of the previous junta were
actively pursued with dreadful consequences. People in the south were
forced to renounce their faith and embrace Islam in order to be eligible
for food aid (a major famine occurred in 1990-1), and their churches and
schools were demolished under the pretext that they were built in violation
of zoning regulations. In the Darfur, the government remained strangely
passive when herders, both Muslim and Arab, armed themselves to force
their way into the grazelands occupied by farmers, mostly Muslim but
non-Arab. Politicization of Islam and Arabism were the reaction of the
government of Khartoum to the bloodshed in Darfur (Jok, 2007: 89-90,
120-7) and, when the idea of a United Nations involvement was initially
proposed, it was immediately rejected as a ”conspiracy against the Arab
and Islamic world” (Economist, 4-10 March 2006: 39).
During the whole period 1990-999, al-Turabi was a dominant force in
Sudanese politics. He became the speaker of the national assembly and
acted energetically to make Sudan a base for extremists from all over the
Islamic world, including Osama bin-Laden (Jok, 2007: 136-7). A clash
eventually erupted between al-Bashir and al-Turabi and the latter was dis-
missed. The fact remains that in Sudan ”the bidding process forced religion
to the centre of what had started as a conflict over the distribution of of-
fices and economic resources” (Duffy Toft, 2007: 125). The result has been
catastrophic, as manifested in lethal famines coexisting with the consider-
able wealth of people close to the regime and one of the longest and most
brutal civil wars in the twentieth century.
The Sudanese example shows that autocrats may sometimes go a long
way toward pleasing religious clerics by adopting regressive institutional
reforms and policies. Pervasive favouritism and corruption of the ruling
clique may be simultaneously observed, attesting that the levels of reforms
and corruption may be, as suggested by the theory, disconnected rather
than strictly complementary choices of the political authority. Specific
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to Sudan is a context characterised by strong centrifugal tensions between
regions and ethnic groups, which makes national unification a quite arduous
task. The north-south conflict was especially nasty because it opposed a
Muslim north to a Christian south. For radical clerics, nothing short of an
Islamisation of the south was acceptable. Worse, the whole clerical body
became radicalised as a result of the conflict with the consequence that
Nimeiri and Bashir gave in to pressures exerted by the religious forces.
The upshot has been stability of the political regime paid with a very dear
price: southern secession, persisting conflicts in Darfur and other parts
of the country, and a return to reactionary customs justified on religious
grounds. The move, which in this instance meant a descent into the abyss,
was rather brutal, illustrating the possibility of a discontinuous jump from
a politico-religious equilibrium in which only a fraction of the clerics (the
moderates) is co-opted to one in which even the most radical elements are
enlisted in support of the ruler.
3.6 Case study 4: Algeria under Boumedienne
General Houari Boumedienne seized power from Ben Bella in June 1965,
supported by left-wing groups in and outside the National Liberation Front
(FLN) which won independence from French colonial power. Boumedienne
also became the chief spokesman for a Muslim and Arab identity, and the
discourse of reformist Islam infiltrated all political language. A bizarre
alliance was sealed between the new socialist, anti-imperialist regime and
the ulama represented by the Conseil Supe´rieur Islamique. The unpopular
policies of Boumedienne, based on state control of the economy, but also
his strong-arm tactics and the corrupt patrimonial practices which he and
the clique around him systematically followed soon aroused a determined
opposition led by intellectuals, students and trade unions. Represented, in
particular, by the National Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and the
National Union of Algerian Students (UNEA), these oppositional forces se-
riously challenged his hold on political power during the year 1968 (Laabas
and Bouhouche, 2011).
To break the students’ movement, Boumedienne mobilised Islamist stu-
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dents of the El Hamel Brotherhood, inciting them to infiltrate the university
of Alger and demonstrate their strength with impunity. In 1971, the UNEA
was dissolved and transformed into the FLN’s Student Youth wing after its
leaders were arrested and exiled to the harsh prison of the south (Tamzali,
2007: 199-202). More generally, Boumedienne used Islam to counteract any
oppositional movement and to lock up the entire civil society. He thus gave
freer rein to the ulama and the more reactionary clerics among them. In
particular, he granted them the right to lead the Arabisation of the country
and to manage the education system (including the right to rewrite school
textbooks). In a more ominous move, still, he encouraged the rise of the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) whose more radical strand was headed by Ali
Belhadj, a puritan cleric who called for the formation of an Islamic state,
if necessary by violent means (Bouamama, 2000: chap. 3; Lapidus, 2002:
599-600). According to Bachir Hadjadj, a close observer of the Algerian
scene and himself a victim of the regime: ”Such decisions, populist and
demagogical, bore the seal of an illegitimate regime which exploited the
religious feelings and emotions of the people of Algeria. The idea was to
persuade common citizens that their religion was under threat and that the
new laws enacted by the state were intended to preserve it (Hadjadj, 2007:
436, our translation; see also Layachi, 1995: 180).
The more radical or ideologically conservative members of the religious
establishment then started to assert their views more aggressively and to
meddle openly in matters of social policy (such as dressing codes, amount of
brideprices, etc.). Moreover, they exerted considerable effort to implement
the Arabisation programme and, toward the late 1970s, all education levels
were completely Arabised. It is thus with the full support of the regime
that the religious dignitaries started to spread the message of a conservative
Islam through the creation of a wide network of Islamist institutes directly
governed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Radical views inspired by the
writings of Taymiyya, Qutb and Mawdudi were widely diffused (Chachoua,
2001: 271-2).
Disastrous effects followed from the Arabisation policy. Like in Pak-
istan under Zia, under-qualified teachers coming from the Quranic schools
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were suddenly promoted and many members of the intelligentsia left the
country (Grandguillaume, 1983). In addition, by imposing Arabic as the
only language taught in official schools, it caused considerable frustration
among the newly educated people who quickly found that they could not
effectively compete with the Francophone elites for access to the highest
positions in the state system. A fertile ground for future recruitment by
Muslim extremists was thereby created.
The growing expression of puritanical views was part and parcel of the
above Islamic drift. In particular, the idea of a ”renaissance” of the country
based on the Islamic tradition and culture was explicitly taken over by the
government (Chachoua, 2001: 271-2). The Minister of Information and
Culture, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, thus declared that ”a cultural revolution
implies a return to the sources”, and that Islam represented the central
value upon which to build the new Algerian society: ”the other values owe
their importance, their existence and their prestige only to their articulation
with Islam or to the fact that they are inspired by or subordinated to Islam”
(cited from Bouamama, 2000: 163). Such views gained the highest official
recognition when the Islamic character of the Algerian state was embedded
most explicitly into the National Charter considered as the ideological and
political programme of revolutionary Algeria.12 The emphasis on Islam as
being the harbinger of social justice and equality shockingly contrasts with
the actual display of wealth by the regime’s clique which, like in Pakistan
and Egypt, includes the high-level staff of the army.
To sum up, Boumedienne succeeded in buying the allegiance of the
official ulama or the high-level clerics. In return, the clerics consistently
paid allegiance to him by condoning his policies, rulings and practices. He
went actually quite far in his concessions to radical clerics, such as when he
12”The Algerian people is an Arab and Muslim people. Islam is the religion of the
state, and one of the fundamental components of the national Algerian personality... It
is to Islam, the religion of militant endeavour, of rigour, justice and equality, that the
Algerian people returned to in the darkest times of the Crusades and colonial domination,
and it is from Islam that they drew the moral force and spiritual energy required to
sustain hope and achieve eventual victory. Islam has shaped the Algerian society and
made it a coherent force, attached to the same land, the same beliefs and the same Arab
language that enabled Algeria to start again contributing to the works of civilisation”
(cited from Bouamama, 2000: 161; authors’ translation).
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allowed them to Islamise the schooling system and to meddle in mundane
matters like dressing code, alcohol drinking, etc. This strategy achieved its
main purpose, to guarantee the stability of his autocratic regime, yet at the
cost of a great measure of obscurantism and the elimination of all influences
exerted by secular forces, the intelligentsia in particular. What needs to be
added is that because the country possesses abundant gaz resources and
its economy generates huge natural resource rents, the autocratic regime
of Boumedienne had the ability to earmark high incomes for itself and
simultaneously redistribute a good share of the national wealth towards
the religious clerics, and what was left to the Algerian people. Moreover,
the rents accruing to the ruling elite was not much affected by the lack
of growth-promoting reforms, particularly in the field of education, which
followed from the regime’s strategic choice to meet the demands of radical
members of the clergy.
4 Conclusion
Autocratic regimes require a legitimacy that cannot be awarded by popular
voting. In countries where the masses are not only materially deprived but
also poorly educated, religion appears as an alternative vector of legitimacy.
A nationalist ideology can also unite a nation around an autocrat but it is
more effectively combined with a religion that the state officially espouses
and projects as a source of identity transcending local particularisms. This
is because religious functionaries or figures tend to be highly respected
by the population, which perceives them as possessing not only advanced
knowledge but also supernatural powers.
In this paper, we argue that autocratic regimes prevailing in Muslim
countries tend to be unstable because of the decentralized nature of Islam:
only a fraction of religious clerics is generally successfully co-opted by the
autocrat. As a result, the clerical body is divided along political lines: on
the one hand, we find the official, high-level ulama who support the regime
in exchange for substantial favours and, on the other hand, we have the
non-official, self-appointed ulama or mullahs who have openly taken the
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side of the oppressed masses. Since the clique in power uses religion to
justify repression of political opposition, what has evolved is a nasty state
of affairs in which religion-based condemnations replace logical arguments
and the whole political debate is framed in the language of religion.
More inclusive co-option of the clerics and, hence, greater political sta-
bility can nonetheless be obtained if special circumstances prevail. One of
these circumstances is an abundant supply of natural resources, which pro-
duces two effects favourable to inclusive co-option. First, the availability of
considerable resource rents enables the autocrat to redistribute a significant
share of the national wealth while appropriating high incomes (in absolute
value) for the benefit of his inner circle. Second, since natural resources can
be effectively exploited even in the absence of growth-conducive conditions
in the wider economy, the autocrat can abstain from progressive reforms,
and thereby placate the clerics, at minimal cost both for himself and for
the population at large.
Saudi Arabia offers a perfect example of the above situation. From
the time of its creation in 1932, the Saudi state has rested on a tight
cooperation between the Saud family and the Wahhabite clerics. The latter
would never have gained the influence that they wield today if the Sauds
did not decide to make Wahhabism the national religion and the symbol
of the national identity. It can however be argued that political stability
and inclusive co-option in Saudi Arabia has caused political instability and
polarising co-option in many other Muslim countries. The mechanism at
work is worth elucidating as it should help us better understand why the
case of partial co-option and political instability is dominant in the lands
of Islam. The theory propounded in the present paper precisely highlights
this mechanism.
To begin with, the immense wealth and the imperialist ambitions of the
Saudi regime greatly contributed to the wide diffusion of the puritanical
doctrine defended by the followers of al-Wahhab (1703-1792) throughout
the Muslim world ( Roy, 2004; Gerges, 2009; Platteau, 2017: chap. 7). Our
model prediicts different effects of a more intense diffusion of radical reli-
gious doctrines or ideologies depending on which type of clerics is affected.
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Since Wahhabism is a puritanical and scripturalist doctrine (the sacred law
enunciated by the Prophet matters more than anything else, and it should
therefore be strictly followed), and since it does not hesitate to preach the
use of violence to achieve its proselityzing end (the jihad), its propagation
is mostly effective among radical clerics. Those are emboldened by the
Wahhabist propaganda and become even more radical than they were be-
fore. The predicted response of the autocrats to this partial radicalisation
of the clerical body consists of the adoption of policies and reforms that
antagonise the emboldened radical clerics and therefore result in greater
political instability. This argument sheds light on the fact that many Mus-
lim autocracies gave up their attempts to collaborate with Islamist parties
or movements, opting instead for an open confrontation with them.
The problem, as evident from our regime case studies, is that autocrats
allied themselves with religious clerics whenever their policies were criti-
cised and their power was disputed by the left-wing opposition. Rather
than fending off criticisms against their iniquitous regime, they thus chose
to stick to their unpopular policies and prebendary practices while inten-
sifying their efforts to seduce the men of religion and the forces of the
religious right. In a context where the secular left had been crushed while
only a fraction of the clerics was co-opted and thereby brought under the
regime’s control, an explosive situation was created for the reason explained
by Platteau (2017: chap. 10):
A bidding war between the regime and its allies in the high
clergy and the masses led by members of the low clergy is
thereby unleashed, which leads to a religious radicalization of
the political debate. Every term of the debate becomes framed
in the religious idiom, fatwas pronounced by religious officials
are succeeded by counter-fatwas issued by lower or self-appointed
clerics, anathema is substituted for reasoned controversies, and
violent confrontation risks replacing peaceful discussion. Plac-
ing the political debate in religious territory becomes even more
risky when the regime’s dark forces embedded into the deep
state give discreet support to violent movements of the reli-
40
gious right, as attested by the examples of Egypt, Pakistan,
Algeria and Syria.
It is therefore distressing to realise that, in order to protect their per-
sonal interests and satisfy their lure for power, secular political leaders did
not hesitate to betray their ideals by cynically appealing to Islam with-
out due consideration for the obnoxious long-term effects of their strategy.
Because it is decentralised, Islam can be highly divisive when it engages
into politics. It is a combustible material that can easily degenerate into
obscurantism, and the risk is especially high when the secular left has dis-
appeared, or almost disappeared from the political stage.
References
[1] Abbas, H., 2005. Pakistan’s drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and
America’s war on terror, M.E. Sharpe, New York & London.
[2] Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D.and Vindigni, A., 2010. A theory of military
dictatorships. American Economic Journal. Macroeconomics, 2 (1),
1-42.
[3] Aldashev, G., and Platteau, J.P., 2013, Religion, culture and develop-
ment. In: V. Ginsburgh and Throsby, D. (Eds.), Handbook of the eco-
nomics of art and culture, Vol. 2. Elsevier and North-Holland, Chap.
21, 587-631.
[4] Auriol, E., and Platteau, J.P., 2016. Religious co-
option in autocracy: a theory inspired by history. Jour-
nal of Development Economics (forthcoming) available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.12.007
[5] Ayubi, N., 1991. Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab
world, Routledge, London and New York.
[6] Baranowski, S., 2011. Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Impe-
rialism from Bismarck to Hitler, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
41
[7] Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A. 1986. The Nash bar-
gaining solution in economic modelling. RAND Journal of Economics,
17, 176-188.
[8] Blaydes, L., and E. Chaney, 2013. The feudal revolution and Europe’s
rise: political divergence of the Christian and Muslim worlds before
1500 CE. American Political Science Review, 107 (1), 16-34.
[9] Bouamama, S., 2000. Alge´rie : Les racines de l’inte´grisme. Editions
EPO, Bruxelles.
[10] Bove, V., J.P. Platteau, and P. Sekeris, 2017. “Political Repression in
Autocratic Regimes”, Journal of Comparative Economics (forthcom-
ing).
[11] Chachoua, K., 2001. L’Islam kabyle. Religion, Etat et socie´te´ en
Alge´rie. Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris.
[12] Cook, S.A., 2012. The struggle for Egypt: from Nasser to Tahrir
square, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[13] Coulson, N.J., 1964. A history of Islamic law. Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh.
[14] De Waal, A., 1997. Famine crimes, politics and the disaster relief in-
dustry in Africa. James Currey, Oxford.
[15] Dreyfuss, R., 2005. Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Un-
leash Fundamentalist Islam, Holt Paperbacks, New York.
[16] Duffy Toft, M., 2007. Getting religious? The puzzling case of Islam
and civil war”, International Security, 31 (4), 97-131.
[17] Economist, 2006, March 4-10. Sunnis and Shi’as, 39.
[18] Egorov, G. and Sonin, K., 2011. Dictators and their Viziers: Endo-
genizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 9 (5), 903–930.
42
[19] Falconi, C., 1967. The Popes in the Twentieth Century. Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, New York.
[20] Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D.K., 1999. The Theory of Learning in
Games, MIT Press, p. 27, ISBN 0-262-06194-5
[21] Gerges, F., 2009. The far enemy: why Jihad went global, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (second edition).
[22] Gilsenan, M., 1982. Recognizing Islam: religion and society in the
modern Arab world, Pantheon Books, New York.
[23] Grandguillaume, G., 1995. Arabisation et politique linguistique au
Maghreb, Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris.
[24] Hadjadj, B., 2007. Les voleurs de reˆves : Cent cinquante ans d’histoire
d’une famille alge´rienne. Albin Michel, Paris.
[25] Haqqani, H., 2005. Pakistan: between mosque and military, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
[26] Harsanyi, J. C. and Selten, R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Se-
lection in Games, MIT Press (1988) ISBN 0-262-08173-3
[27] Hourani, A., 1991. A history of the Arab peoples. The Belknap Press
of the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
[28] Ibrahim, S.E., 1995. Islamic activism and political opposition in
Egypt”. In: Ibrahim, S.E., 2002. Egypt. Islam and democracy: critical
essays. The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo & New York,
Chap. 3, 53-68.
[29] Iyer, S., 2016. The New Economics of Religion, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. LIV, N o 2, pp. 395-441.
[30] Janos, A.C., 1982. The politics of backwardness in Hungary, 1825-
1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
[31] Johnson, D.H., 2003. The root causes of Sudan’civil wars. James Cur-
rey, Oxford.
43
[32] Jok, M. J., 2007. Sudan: race, religion, and violence. Oneworld, Ox-
ford.
[33] Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J. and Rob, R., 1993, Learning, Mutation,
and Long-run Equilibria in Games, Econometrica 61, pp. 29-56.
[34] Kepel, G., 2005. The roots of radical Islam. Saqi Books, London.
[35] Laabas, B., and Bouhouche, A., 2011. Algeria: democracy and devel-
opment under the aegis of the ‘authoritarian bargain’”. In: Elbadawi,
I., and Makdisi, S. (Eds), 2011. Democracy in the Arab world: ex-
plaining the deficit, Routledge, London and New York, 196-226.
[36] Lapide, P., 1967. Three popes and the Jews. Hawthorn Books.
[37] Lapidus, I., 1988. A history of Islamic societies, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (first edition).
[38] Lapidus, I., 2002. A history of Islamic societies, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (second edition).
[39] Layachi, A., 1995. Algeria: reinstating the state or instating a civil
society?” In: Zartman, I.W. (Ed.), Collapsed states: the disintegra-
tion and restoration of legitimate authority. Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Boulder & London, 171-189.
[40] Lewy, G., 1964. The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, New York.
[41] Malik, A., 2012. Was the Middle East’s economic descent a legal or po-
litical failure? Debating the Islamic law matters thesis. CSAE Work-
ing Paper WPS/2012-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies,
University of Oxford.
[42] Marsot, A.L., 2007. A history of Egypt: from the Arab conquest to
the present. Cambridge University Press (2nd edition), Cambridge.
[43] Meredith, M., 2005. The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of
independence. The Free Press, London.
44
[44] Montagnes, P. and Wolton, S., 2016. Mass purges: top-down account-
ability in autocracy. SSRN Working Paper.
[45] North, D., Wallis, J., and Weingast, B. 2009. Violence and Social
Orders: a Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human
History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[46] Obolonsky, V. 2003. The drama of Russian political history: system
against individuality. Texas A & M University Press, Austin.
[47] Perrie, M., 2006 (Ed.). The Cambridge history of Russia, Vol. I: From
early Rus’ to 1689, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[48] Platteau, J.-P., 2008. Religion, politics, and development: lessons from
the lands of Islam. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
68 (2), 329-351.
[49] Platteau, J.-P., 2011. Political instrumentalization of Islam and the
risk of obscurantist deadlock. World Development, 39 (2), 243-260.
[50] Platteau, J.P., 2017. Islam instrumentalised: religion and politics in
historical perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (forth-
coming).
[51] Plokhy, S., 2006. The origins of the Slavic nations: premodern iden-
tities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
[52] Ramadan, A.A., 1993. Fundamentalist influence in Egypt: the strate-
gies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir groups”. In: Marty,
M.E., and Appleby, R.S. (Eds.). Fundamentalisms and the state: re-
making polities, economies, and militance. The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago and London, 152-183.
[53] Roy, O., 1993. Afghanistan: an Islamic war of resistance”. In: Marty,
M.E., and Appleby, R.S. (Eds.). Fundamentalisms and the state: re-
making polities, economies, and militance. The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago and London, 491-510.
45
[54] Roy, O., 2004. Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah.
Columbia University Press, New York.
[55] Schmemann, A., 2003. The historical road of Eastern Orthodoxy, St
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York.
[56] Tamzali, W., 2007. Une education alge´rienne : de la re´volution a` la
de´cennie noire, Gallimard, Paris.
[57] Young, H.P., 1993. The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica, 61,
pp. 57-84
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Lets first consider the corner solution p = µ < 1. The autocrat solves:
max
α,β
Uaµ(α, β) = µG(α, β)− 2θV (α, β). (13)
Optimizing (13) with respect to α and β yields the first-order conditions:
∂Uaµ
∂α
= µGα(α, β)− 2θVα(α, β) = 0 (14)
∂Uaµ
∂β
= µGβ(α, β)− 2θVβ(α, β) = 0 (15)
we deduce that at the optimum
Gα(α, β)
Vα(α, β)
=
Gβ(α, β)
Vβ(α, β)
(16)
Let us now look at the corner solution p = 1. The autocrat solves:
max
α,β
Ua1(α, β) = G(α, β)− 2θV (α, β). (17)
Optimizing (17) with respect to α and β yields the first-order conditions:
∂Ua1
∂α
= Gα(α, β)− 2θVα(α, β) = 0 (18)
∂Ua1
∂β
= Gβ(α, β)− 2θVβ(α, β) = 0 (19)
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we deduce that at the optimum
Gα(α, β)
Vα(α, β)
=
Gβ(α, β)
Vβ(α, β)
(20)
Equations (16), (20) and (6) are all equivalent.
For the second order condition, since Vα,α(α, β) ≥ 0 and Gα,α(α) ≤ 0
and since Vβ,β(α, β) ≥ 0 and Gβ,β(α) ≤ 0 the autocrat’s objective function
is concave. The first-order condition is therefore sufficient. QED
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and illustration
Equation (6) is equivalent to Gα(α, β)Vβ(α, β) − Gβ(α, β)Vα(α, β) = 0.
Totally differentiating this expression yields:
dβ
dα
=
Gβ(α,β)Vαα(α,β)−Gαα(α,β)Vβ(α,β)+Gβα(α,β)Vα(α,β)−Gα(α,β)Vβα(α,β)
Gα(α,β)Vββ(α,β)−Gββ(α,β)Vα(α,β)+Gαβ(α,β)Vβ(α,β)−Gβ(α,β)Vαβ(α,β) (21)
This can be rewritten as
dβ
dα
=
Gβ(α,β)Vαα(α,β)−Gαα(α,β)Vβ(α,β)+Gα(α,β)(Gβα(α,β) Vα(α,β)Gα(α,β)−Vβα(α,β))
Gα(α,β)Vββ(α,β)−Gββ(α,β)Vα(α,β)+Gβ(α,β)(Gαβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
Gβ(α,β)
−Vαβ(α,β))
(22)
By virtue of (6) the two terms in parenthesis in the numerator and in the
denominator are equal. Since the terms outside the parenthesis are strictly
positive by the concavity of G and the strict convexity of V in (α, β), we
deduce that a sufficient condition for dβ
dα
≥ 0 is that
Gαβ(α, β)
Vα(α, β)
Gα(α, β)
− Vαβ(α, β) ≥ 0. (23)
This condition holds if and only if the function Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
is non decreasing in
β. This complete the proof of Proposition 2.
We now turn to the analysis of the example. Let assume that G(α, β) =
βG(α) and V (α, β) = V(α)
1−β with β ∈ [0, 1). It implies in (6) that
β = V
′(α)G(α)
V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G′(α) ∈ [0, 1) (24)
We deduce that
dβ
dα
= V
′′(α)G(α)+G′(α)V ′(α)
V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G′(α) − V
′(α)G(α)(V ′′(α)G(α)+2G′(α)V ′(α)+G′′(α)V(α))
(V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G′(α))2 . (25)
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dβ
dα
T 0 is therefore equivalent to:
V ′′(α)
V ′(α) +
G′(α)
G(α) T
V ′′(α)G(α)+2G′(α)V ′(α)+G′′(α)V(α)
V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G′(α) . (26)
Multiplying left and right by V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G ′(α) and simplifying yields
G ′(α)
G(α) −
G ′′(α)
G ′(α) T
V ′(α)
V(α) −
V ′′(α)
V ′(α) (27)
which is (8). QED
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that G(α, β) = βK α
g
g
, and V (α, β) = W
1−β
αv
v
, with K,W > 0 and
v > 1 > g > 0. We deduce that (6) is equivalent to
βKαg−1
Kαg
g =
Wαv−1
(1− β)Wαv v(1− β)
2. (28)
Simplifying this equation yields:
β∗ =
v
v + g
. (29)
Substituting this value in the autocrat’s utility function yields for a pair
(θ, p) ∈ {(θ, µ), (θ, 1)}:
Uap(α, β∗) = p
v
v + g
K
αg
g
− θv + g
g
W
αv
v
(30)
Deriving Uap(α, β∗) with respect to α yields the first order condition:
∂Uap(α, β∗)
∂α
= p
v
v + g
Kαg−1 − θv + g
g
Wαv−1 = 0 (31)
Under our assumptions that g < 1 and v > 1 it is easy to check that the
second order condition is satisfied: ∂
2Uap(α,β∗)
∂α2
< 0. We deduce that:
α∗(p
θ
) =
(
p
θ
vg
(v + g)2
K
W
) 1
v−g
(32)
Substituting β∗ and α∗ in the utility function of the autocrat yields:
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Ua∗(p, θ) =
{
pv
v + g
K
g
− θv + g
g
W
v
(α∗)v−g
}
(α∗)g
=
{
pv
v + g
K
g
− θv + g
g
W
v
(
p
θ
vg
(v + g)2
K
W
)}(
p
θ
vg
(v + g)2
K
W
) g
v−g
= p
(p
θ
) g
v−g
(
vg
(v + g)2
K
W
) g
v−g K
g
v − g
v + g
We deduce that
Ua∗(µ, θ) > Ua∗(1, θ) ⇔ µ
(
µ
θ
) g
v−g
>
(
1
θ
) g
v−g
(33)
which is equivalent to (10). QED
5.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We need to solve
max
w,α,β
(
G(α, β)− w
)1−c(
w − θcV (α, β)
)c
s.t. w ≥ EθV (α, β)
The Lagrangian associated to this problem is
L =
(
G(α, β)− w
)1−c(
w − θcV (α, β)
)c
+ λ
(
w − EθV (α, β)
)
It yields
∂L
∂α
= (1−c)Gα(α, β)
(
w−θcV (α,β)
G(α,β)−w
)c
−cθcVα(α, β)
(
G(α,β)−w
w−θcV (α,β)
)1−c
−λEθVα(α, β) = 0
∂L
∂β
= (1−c)Gβ(α, β)
(
w−θcV (α,β)
G(α,β)−w
)c
−cθcVβ(α, β)
(
G(α,β)−w
w−θcV (α,β)
)1−c
−λEθVβ(α, β) = 0
∂L
∂w
= −(1− c)
(
w−θcV (α,β)
G(α,β)−w
)c
+ c
(
G(α,β)−w
w−θcV (α,β)
)1−c
+ λ = 0
Moreover, we have that λ(w−EθV (α, β)) = 0. Two cases are possible.
1. If w > EθV (α, β), it follows that λ = 0 so that the solution to this
problem is wc = (1− c)θcV (α, β) + cG(α, β) and αc and βc are such
that Gα(α, β) = θ
cVα(α, β) and Gβ(α, β) = θ
cVβ(α, β), which im-
plies θc = Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
=
Gβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
and therefore condition (6). The con-
dition w > EθV (α, β) is then equivalent to (1 − c)θcV (αc, βc) +
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cG(αc, βc) > EθV (αc, βc). Substituting θc = Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
=
Gβ(α,β)
Vβ(α,β)
and
dividing right and left by V (αc, βc) yields Eθ < cG(α
c,βc)
V (αc,βc)
+ (1 −
c)
Gβ(α
c,βc)
Vβ(αc,βc)
= cG(α
c,βc)
V (αc,βc)
+ (1− c)Gα(αc,βc)
Vα(αc,βc)
. We deduce condition 1.
2. If λ > 0, we have that wc = EθV (α, β). We deduce from ∂L
∂w
= 0
that λ = (1 − c)
(
(Eθ−θc)V (α,β)
G(α,β)−EθV (α,β)
)c
− c
(
G(α,β)−EθV (α,β)
(Eθ−θc)V (α,β)
)1−c
. Substi-
tuting this value in ∂L
∂α
= 0 yields (1 − c)(Gα(α, β) − EθVα(α, β)) +
cVα(α, β)
G(α,β)−EθV (α,β)
V (α,β)
= 0. Dividing right and left by Vα(α, β) and
simplifying yields (1 − c)Gα(α,β)
Vα(α,β)
+ cG(α,β)
V (α,β)
= Eθ. Similarly when we
substitute λ in ∂L
∂β
= 0 it yields (1 − c)(Gβ(α, β) − EθVβ(α, β)) +
cVβ(α, β)
G(α,β)−EθV (α,β)
V (α,β)
= 0. Dividing right and left by Vβ(α, β) and
simplifying yields condition 2.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Let G(α, β) = βG(α) and V (α, β) = V(α)
1−β with β ∈ [0, 1) and V′(α)V(α) ≥ G ′(α)G(α) .
For instance if G(α) = K αg
g
, and V(α) = W αv
v
, with K,W > 0 and v >
1 > g > 0, the condition V′(α)V(α) ≥ G ′(α)G(α) is equivalent to v ≥ g, which holds
by assumption. Let also assume that the autocrat picks the corner solution
pd = 1 over the interior solution in the case of a decentralized religion.
With the power functions example this occurs if µ
v
g > θ
θ
.
We deduce from (6) and from (i) in Proposition 4 that βd(α) = βc(α) =
β(α) so that:
β(α) = V
′(α)G(α)
V ′(α)G(α)+V(α)G′(α) ∈ [0, 1). (34)
The level of reform in the decentralized case, αd, solves (see equation 18):
Gα(α,β(α))
Vα(α,β(α))
= 2θ, which is equivalent to β(α)(1− β(α))G′(α)V ′(α) = 2θ.
In the centralized case the level of reform is lower when θc is large so
we focus on the case where θc = θ (i.e., it is the less favorable scenario
for reforms in the centralized case). We’ve already established that when
θc = θ then case (ii) in Proposition 4 holds. We deduce that αc is so that:
Gα(α,β(α))
Vα(α,β(α))
= θ, which is equivalent to β(α)(1− β(α))G′(α)V ′(α) = 2θ.
So to prove the result that αc ≥ αd we need to show that the function
β(α)(1− β(α))G′(α)V ′(α) is decreasing in α.
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d
(
β(α)(1− β(α))G′(α)V ′(α))
)
dα
=
dβ(α)
dα
(1− 2β(α))G
′(α)
V ′(α) (35)
So since dβ(α)
dα
> 0, a sufficient condition for
Gα(α,β(α))
Vα(α,β(α))
to decrease with
α is that β(α) ≥ 0.5, which is equivalent to 2V ′(α)G(α) ≥ V ′(α)G(α) +
V(α)G ′(α). We deduce the condition V ′(α)V(α) ≥ G
′(α)
G(α) .
51
